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Abstract 
The present study includes a set of experiments on children's understanding of "knowing 
how" and "knowing that" for self and other. It was conducted with seventy-two 3-, 4-，and 
5-year-old preschool children in Hong Kong, China. Children were asked to judge their 
own states of knowing as well as that of others at critical phases of the tasks: (1) Pre-
exposure; (2) Post-exposure; and (3) Post-performance. Our results reveal a clear 
developmental progression in children's understanding of "knowing how" and "knowing 
that," regardless of self or other. In general, children demonstrated better self-
understandings than other-understanding, regardless of "knowing how" or “knowing that." 
Moreover, children's understanding of "knowing that" preceded their understanding of 
"knowing how" despite variations among experiments. Furthermore, children's 
interpretation of "knowing how" and "knowing that" proceeds from an early sense of 
distinctive use of performance outcome to later appreciation of the significance of 
informational access in the formation of knowledge. 
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摘要 
本硏究的一系列實驗旨在測試小朋友對於“識” (knowing how)和“知” (knowing that) 
這兩個槪念的理解，當中包括小朋友對自己及對其他人的了解0本硏究在中國香港 
進行，七十二位受試者分別爲三、四、五歲就讀幼稚園的小朋友。在實驗當中’小 
朋友需要在若干個重要時刻判斷自己和其他人的認識狀態(states of knowing)：(一） 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Various studies have examined what children understand about mental states (e.g., 
knowing and thinking) and their appreciation of similarities or differences in mental states 
across different targets (e.g., Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 
1993; Gopnik & Astington，1988; Johnson & Wellman, 1982; Ruffman & Olson, 1989; 
Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). Yet most of these studies have focused on 
children's understanding of their knowledge of facts -- "knowing that" but not their 
knowledge of skilled action --"knowing how." "Knowing that" and "knowing how" are 
different (e.g., one can know that a cake is baked, without knowing how to bake it, and 
vice versa). Imagine spending a leisurely Saturday afternoon at home, sharing a piece of 
tiramisu with your 4-year-old daughter, who is interested in cookery. While she is eating, 
she looks up at you and asks, "What is this called?" Of course, you would able to tell her 
that it is tiramisu; however, you may not be able to answer her next question- "How was it 
made?" Indeed, this situation involves several aspects of the child's understanding of 
"knowing how" and "knowing that." First of all, in this example the child shows an 
understanding of knowledge of self. This refers to the girl's ability to recognize that she 
herself does not know the name of the food and does not know how it was made. Second, 
the child exhibits an understanding of knowledge of the other. This refers to the girl's 
ability to recognize that her mother/father may know the name of the food or how to make 
it. Actually, the girl's ability to recognize her own ignorance as well as an other's states of 
knowing depends on the sophistication of her "theory of mind"- her understanding of her 
own mental states and that of others. Thus, in order to have a comprehensive study of 
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children's understanding of knowing, both the concepts of "knowing that" and "knowing 
how" with regard to self and other should be included. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the development of children's 
understanding of "knowing how" and "knowing that" for both ^ and other in three 
experimental paradigms. The results of Fung (2000) suggest this ability develops during 
the preschool years. In the study of Fung (2000), children were asked to report their states 
of knowing before and after they had learned the contents of a drawer (i.e., by looking 
inside or being told about the contents by the experimenter) or the skills to perform a 
magic trick. It was found that 3-year-old children consistently reported that they "know" 
before they had access to the relevant information whereas the 5-year-old children were 
able to report that they "didn't know" in such a state of ignorance. Moreover, Wimmer, 
Hogrefe, and Perner (1988) found that most 4-year-olds but few 3-year-olds understood 
the relation between exposure to perceptual information and resulting knowledge. Thus, 
the present study recruited preschool children ranging in age from 3 years to 5 years in 
order to determine the developmental progression in children's understanding of 
knowledge, if any. Gender differences in children's understandings of "knowing how" and 
"knowing that" were also explored in this study. 
In fact, the domain of "knowing" is key in the mental state literature. It consists of 
two major concepts which young children are most likely to come across: "knowing how" 
and "knowing that." "Knowing how" and "knowing that" are widely described as 
procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge, respectively, in the field of cognitive 
psychology (Browne, 1997). "Knowing how" is typically revealed implicitly through 
performances on tasks for which conscious awareness of an experienced event is not 
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necessary (Lorsbach, Sodoro, & Brown，1992). For example, if one asks a child to reveal 
his/her ability to play a piano, he/she would simply show it by playing pieces of music in 
front of others instead of describing his/her knowledge in spoken words; in fact, 
demonstrating such competence is far easier than describing it. Therefore, "knowing how" 
has been referred to as knowledge which is procedural (Tulving, 1985), "implicit" (Graf & 
Schacter, 1985)，and "indirect" (Johnson & Hasher, 1987). 
"Knowing that," on the other hand, is expressed explicitly when asked to bring to 
mind a prior experience with conscious awareness (Lorsbach, Sodoro, & Brown, 1992). 
For instance, when a child claims, “I know that doll is under the bed," she is referring to 
her "knowing that" and making use of her recall of a particular event. Thus, "knowing 
that" has been described as the knowledge which is "episodic" (Tulving, 1972), "explicit" 
(Graf & Schacter，1985), and "direct" (Johnson & Hasher, 1987). 
The concept of "knowing how" might be an important mental state instrumental in 
the emerging awareness of young children who are busy acquiring skills such as learning 
how to run, jump, feed themselves, put on clothes, write, or draw (Tardif & Wellman, 
2000). Because learning how to do something is closely related to the mental state of 
"knowing how," it is necessary for children to develop a concept about "knowing how." 
Similarly, the concept of "knowing that" is also important for young children's 
understanding of mind. Children, during the preschool years, start to differentiate "what is 
known" and "what is not known" in order to communicate effectively with others. For 
example, when chatting with another person, we need to make assumptions about his/her 
state of knowledge, and the way we express ourselves is guided by these assumptions 
(Nickerson, Baddeley & Freeman, 1987). 
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Without doubt, children have everyday experiences of other people in their immediate 
environment (e.g., parents, older siblings) who are more knowledgeable and competent 
than they are. In other words, children are often in the position of not knowing. Being 
aware of when we do not know is important; otherwise, we do not know when to seek help. 
On the other hand, being aware that we know various facts and have different kinds of 
skills give us confidence about our competence and this influence our actions. Similarly, 
being aware of what others' know allows us to monitor our conversations and to decide 
when it is necessary to adjust our elaboration of details. All of the above stated that 
knowledge about the mind plays a critical role in children's everyday communication with 
other people (Dunn, 1994) and their social understanding (Leekam, 1993; Taylor, 1996). 
Given this account of the importance of knowing to children's cognitive and social 
development, the present study investigated Hong Kong Chinese children's understandings 
of "knowing how" and "knowing that" in both themselves and others. 
Bartsch and Estes (1996) suggested that children's initial understanding of mental states 
provides a foundation for later metacognition- cognition about cognition. As Wellman (1985) 
proposed, metacognition consists of a large, multi-faceted theory of mind. That is, theory of 
mind constitutes the framework within which more specific metacognitive understandings 
(e.g., a recognition that looking leads to knowing) can develop. Thus, I consider the relation 
between theory of mind and metacognition below. 
"Knowing that One Knows’， 
Children's understanding of mental states is one aspect of what has been broadly 
termed "metacognition" (e.g., Astington, 1993; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Flavell, Miller, 
& Miller，1993; Perner, 1991: Wellman, 1990). Metacognition is regarded as individuals' 
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awareness and regulation of their own cognitive states and processes (Flavell, 1985). It is 
presumed to consist of two major components: metacognitive awareness and 
metacognitive experience. Metacognitive awareness refers to people's knowledge about 
the cognitive states and processes of both themselves and others (Corkill, 1996)，whereas 
metacognitive experience refers to the cognitive or affective experiences that go along 
with some ongoing cognitive endeavors (Flavell, 1979). 
Metacognitive awareness, the focus of the present study, can be further subdivided 
into individuals' knowledge about differences among people, tasks, and strategies. When 
thinking about persons, we can further subdivide our understanding into three factors: (1) 
intraindividual differences; (2) interindividual differences; and (3) universals of cognition 
(Flavell, 1979). Having knowledge about intraindividual differences means that 
individuals could be aware of how their cognitive processes differ across situations (e.g., 
they know that they learn better by reading than listening; Corkill, 1996). This is similar to 
the awareness of how "knowing how" and "knowing that" vary across different critical 
points of tasks. For example, before we have exposure to the relevant information, we 
should claim that we "don't know" and only after we have access to the information, can 
we claim we "know." Having knowledge about interindividual differences implies an 
understanding that people may differ in their cognitive processing competences and 
strategies as they involve comparisons between individuals, says, the self versus other 
people or person A versus person B (e.g., persons know that one friend is better at sports 
than another; Corkill, 1996). Both intraindividual and interindividual differences were 
investigated in the present study. 
Apart from the intraindividual and interindividual differences among people's mind, 
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children's "theories of knowing" are also explored. In fact, children's conception of 
"knowing how" and "knowing that," is a reflection of how they reason about knowledge. 
Children may interpret the states of knowing with reference to external states (e.g., 
performance outcome) or they can understand it in terms of the presence or absence of a 
knowledge base. No matter how chidlren comprehend "knowing how" and "knowing 
that," epistemology provides us with some ideas of what knowledge is. 
"Knowing" versus “Guessing” 
From the view of epistemologists, knowledge is true belief that can be backed up with 
an account or explanation (Greco, 1999). In other words, when we claim to know 
something, we should be able to give good reasons for it. For example, when we claim to 
know there is a doll inside a box, we are able to justify our knowledge by saying that we 
have looked at it before. Moreover, epistemologists regard persons who know as different 
and superior to those who have only an opinion, even if the opinion happens to be true. In 
this view, persons who only have an opinion should be better regarded as "guessing" 
instead of "knowing," since they are not able to justify their belief by giving reasons on 
demand (Greco, 1999). Similarly, psychologists also address the differences between 
"knowing" and "guessing". In the study of Johnson and Wellman (1980), young children 
were found to confuse the cases of knowing and guessing. They could not differentiate the 
mental verbs of "know" from "guess" by referring to the presence or absence of a 
knowledge base. Moreover, children were found to rely on performance outcome as the 
basis of mental verbs judgments. These findings raise the question of whether young 
children understand the states of knowing in terms of the performance outcome or the 
presence of a knowledge base or both of them. In the present study, children's 
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understanding of knowing was studied under four manipulated conditions as stated in 
Table 1，which were formed using different combinations of access to information and 
success of performance (or correctness of response). 
Table 1 
Four Manipulated Conditions for the “Knowing How" and "Knowing That" 
Conditions Access to information Successful Performance 
Knowing + + 
Guessing - + 
Not Yet Mastered + -
Unknown - -
“+，’ represents the presence of informational access or successful performance; 
‘‘-“represents the absence of informational access or successful performance. 
As can be seen in Table 1，only one of these four conditions can be truly regarded as 
"knowing." This is the condition in which persons are able to demonstrate successful 
performances (e.g., able to tell the contents of a box correctly) and justication of their 
knowledge with a knowledge base (e.g., having access to the contents before). However, if 
the persons only demonstrate successful performances but are not able to justify them with 
reasons, this is better regarded as "guessing." For those who have a knowledge base (i.e., 
access to relevant information) but are not able to demonstrate successful performance, 
their state should be regarded as "not yet mastered." This situation is similar to the case in 
which although a teacher has already taught students how to do a particular type of 
mathematics in class, some of her students still do not know how to solve given 
mathematics questions of this type after class. In this example, the students have access to 
learning, but they can not yet demonstrate successful performance. The last condition is 
thecharacterized as "unknown," which is simply the case of no access, and, therefore, they 
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"don't know" how to perform successfully. 
If children confuse "know" with "guess," they are likely to overestimate their own 
and others' knowledge. In contrast, if children understand that informational access is 
essential for "knowing how" and "knowing that," they will not attribute knowledge to 
themselves or others when they do not have informational access. In short, overestimation 
of knowledge results from children's inability to conceptualize the processes by which 
"knowing how" and "knowing that" are constructed from informational access. 
Theory of Mind: Self versus Other 
By far, most studies of children's understandings of different persons' mental states 
under the theory of mind paradigm have contrasted the s ^ to the other (Miller, 2000). 
Within the theory of mind framework, the relation between developing understandings of 
one's own and developing understandings of the other's mental states has been regarded as 
the main focus for discussion. The typical question asked is “Do children experience their 
own mental states directly and then use such knowledge of s ^ to simulate the experience 
of others?，’ or "Does the understanding of one's own mental states have to be inferred in 
much the same way as the understandings of other's mental states?" (Taylor, 1996). 
Different theories about the development of theory of mind vary in their predictions. 
Proponents of the “theory theory" position claim that children's understanding of 
mind is sets up as a causal-explanatory system which is analogous to characteristics of 
theories (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Changes in children's understanding of mind may be 
observed as the theory changes. In this view, the process underlying the discovery of one's 
own psychological states is similar to the process underlying the discovery of the 
psychological states of other people (Taylor, 1996). Thus the theory theorists predict 
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young children's development in understanding of their mental states to proceed in parallel 
with their understanding of other's mental states (Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994). 
Children who have difficulty understanding other people's mental states should have 
difficulty in identical ways and to the same extent in their understanding of their own 
mental states (Taylor, 1996). Children's knowledge about mind for both themselves and 
others’ are understood roughly simultaneously, with no general priority of one or another 
(Miller, 2000). As for the accuracy of children's reports of their own mental states, theory 
theory does not expect them to be particularly accurate since children's own mental states 
have to be inferred instead of being directly perceived. Thus, the possibility of error is 
much more likely and the types of errors they make depend on the general theory of mind 
children hold (Taylor, 1996). Therefore, in this view, young children's reports of others' 
mental states are also not expected to be especially accurate because of their mis-reporting 
of their own mental states. 
In contrast, simulation theory (Harris, 1992) states that a theory of mind is not 
necessary for having psychological beliefs. Psychological beliefs are simply the result of 
having a mind which gives rise to psychological experiences (Goldman, 1993). In this view, 
young children experience their own mental states directly and use their understanding of 
minds as the basis for making inferences about the mental states of others (Johnson, 1988). 
Thus, proponents of simulation theory predict young children's understanding of their own 
mental states will emerge earlier than that of other people (Taylor, Esbensen, & Benett, 
1994). Self-knowledge about mental states has the characteristics of immediacy, which is 
not possessed by knowledge about others. Therefore, given prior self-understanding of 
mental states, others，mental states are understood via a simulation process (Miller, 2000). 
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In actuality, both sequences of understanding about mental states — self and other 
equivalent and, self earlier than other - are found in the empirical literature. The false 
belief task (unexpected contents task) is commonly viewed as a typical task that involves 
self-other comparisons about knowledge of mental states, and studies involving such tasks 
also report mixed findings. However, none of these studies indicate a large discrepancy 
between 幽 and other (Miller, 2000). Most of the evidence about self-other comparisons 
has come from research on false belief and was designed to examine children's knowledge 
of "thinking." What has not been examined is children's understanding of "knowing" with 
regard to both themselves and others. Thus, self-other comparisons about young children's 
understandings of "knowing how" and "knowing that" will be a central issue investigated 
in the present study. This is important, because indications from previous research (Fung, 
2000; Moore, Furrow, Chasson, & Patriquin，1994; Tardif & Wellman, 2000) suggest that 
children's understanding of some forms of "knowing" may precede their understanding of 
"thinking." Thus, it may be more possible to catch early differences in children's emerging 
understandings of mental states by examining their understanding of knowing. If 
children's understanding of their own "knowing" and that of others require a similar level 
of cognitive abilities, then it is likely that both kinds of knowledge will emerge 
simultaneously. If, on the other hand, children acquire understanding of knowing for one's 
self versus for others at different rates, this would suggest that one of them is more 
difficult than another. As mentioned before, since young children experience their own 
mental states directly, but not that of others，, it seems to be logical to assume that 
self-understanding is better than other-understanding. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
children's understanding of knowing for self emerges earlier than for other. 
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Children's "Theory of Knowing How’， 
Perner claimed that successful action and access to information are basic elements of 
knowledge (Esbensen, Taylor, & Stoess, 1997). Will children incorporate these elements 
into their theory of "knowing how?" 
(i) Successful Action 
Based on some empirical evidence that many 3-year-old children and some 4-year-olds 
use the word "know" to refer to a person who acts successfully, even though the person did 
not have prior access to the relevant information (Johnson & Wellman, 1980; Perner, 1991; 
Wellman & Johnson, 1979)，Perner argued that successful action is the most salient indicator 
of knowing among children. Bearing in mind that successful action is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient indicator of knowledge, it is interesting to examine whether successful action is a 
salient indicator of "knowing how" for children. 
(ii) Access to Information 
Apart from successful action, access to information is also necessary for "knowing 
how." In order to have a fully developed theory of "knowing how," children should also 
recognize that having access to the information is a prerequisite to "knowing how." This is 
because, without access to a learning opportunity, children would not be able to perform a 
particular task successfully, and would not be able to claim that they "know how." 
As stated above, it is proposed that children's "theory of knowing how" has two 
major components. Moreover, it is hypothesized that children acquire the two components 
in the sequence of successful action followed by access to information. Such a sequence of 
development is suggested by the fact that successful action is the most salient indicator of 
"knowing how" and once the children know how to do particular things, they simply 
Children's Understanding of Knowing 42 
forget about the source of their knowledge (Fung, 2000) and, thus, do not pay much 
attention to how they accessed the information. 
Children's 'Theory of Knowing That，， 
Similarly, in order to understand the concept of "knowing that," children should 
recognize certain basic elements: truthfulness and access to information. Again, it is 
interesting to investigate when children begin to incorporate these elements into their 
theory of "knowing that." 
(i) Truthfulness 
It is agreed that a person who says, "1 + 1 equals 3" cannot be said to "know" the 
answer to this question as the belief is false. In general, the awareness of some state that is 
consistent with the true state of affairs is "knowing" (Montgomery, 1992). Young children 
show early accomplishment in differentiating states consistent with the true state of affairs 
from those inconsistent with the true state of affairs: children as young as age of 2 to 3 
refute false statements and support true ones in their conversations (Pea, 1982). 
To grasp the meaning of knowing, children are required to be credited with a 
conception of truthfulness since a person's knowledge references a true state of affairs 
(e.g., a person can "know" there are candies in a box only if the box really contains 
candies; Esbensen, Taylor, & Stoess, 1997). In fact, "knowing that" is the knowledge 
which is related to learning factual information about the world in which we are living. 
Therefore, examining whether young children take the true state of affairs into account for 
their knowing would be a useful starting point for understanding children's "theory of 
knowing that." 
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(ii) Access to Information 
Other than truthfulness, children should understand that having access to information 
is critical for "knowing that." Without access to information, children will not be able to 
tell what has happened in the world, and this will not allow a child to qualify as "knowing 
that." 
Similar to children's "theory of knowing how," it is proposed that children's “theory 
of knowing that" consists of two major components. Indeed, two theories of knowing are 
quite similar in structure with the exception that the component of successful action in 
"theory of knowing how" is replaced with truthfulness in a "theory of knowing that." 
Again, it is hypothesized that children acquire the two components in sequence of 
truthfulness followed by access to information. Truthfulness is proposed to be acquired 
before the other component because it is the easiest for children to judge. As soon as 
children know the fact about the world (e.g., there is a candy inside a box) they will most 
likely forget about the source of their knowledge (Fung, 2000), and thus overlook the 
importance of access to information. Components and the predicted developmental 
sequence of children's theories of "knowing how" and "knowing that" are summarized in 
Table 2 and Table 3，respectively. 
Table 2 
Summary of Children 's “Theory of Knowing How" and "Theory of Knowing That" 
Knowing How Knowing That 
Components 
Successful Action ^ -
Truthfulness - ^ 
Access to Information ^ ^ 
represents the presence of the component in the concept; "- “ represents the absence of 
the component in the concept. 
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Table 3 
Predicted Developmental Sequence of Children’ s "Theories of Knowing “ 
First Component Second Component 
to Develop to Develop 
"Knowing How" Successful Action Access to Information 
"Knowing That" Truthfulness Access to Information 
In the present study, the three experiments on children's understanding of "knowing 
how" and "knowing that" relied on knowledge-judgment paradigm. In Experiment 1, we 
tested children's sensitivity to informational access in the assessment of their own and 
others' knowledge. In Experiment 2, we examined children's reliance on the other's 
performance in their attribution of knowledge to others; whereas in Experiment 3, 
children's understanding of others，"knowing how" and "knowing that" was studied when 
the children were ignorant. 
Our tasks included test questions that address three aspects of knowing- access, 
performance and, person- by asking children questions about their judgments of 
knowledge at critical points in both knowing-that and knowing-how tasks. Particularly, we 
asked children both before and after they had been exposed to critical information if they 
knew a simple fact or knew how to perform a simple skill. Both of these judgments 
assessed children's understanding of their current knowledge states. Moreover, in this 
procedure, if children are sensitive to the issue of access, then they should claim "don't 
know" on the pre-exposure questions. In contrast, after being exposed to the information, 
they should claim to "know" on the post-exposure questions. Assessing the differences 
between children's claims on these two questions provides us with ideas about their 
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sensitivity to access as a basis for knowing. Apart from self-knowledge, we are also 
interested in children's understanding of others' states of knowledge. Similarly, such 
understanding was examined by children's judgments about others, states of knowledge in 
critical points of pre- and post-exposure. Thus, we contrasted children's judgments of self 
with other for both the knowing-that and the knowing-how tasks. 
In Experiment 2, children's sensitivity to performance as a component of knowing 
was investigated. In order to examine this, children were asked to judge the states of 
knowledge of others after their performance. Half of the time children were shown a 
successful performance and half a failure performance. If children are sensitive to 
performance of others, then they should always attribute knowledge to those who 
performed successfully but not to those failed. Moreover, we also tested children on false 
belief tasks which were designed to be parallel to our knowing-that and knowing-how 
tasks. This provides a comparison task for assessing children's understanding of knowing 
more broadly constructed. 
In summary, the present study was aimed at investigating children's emerging 
understandings of what it means to "know" for 翅 and other in two types of knowledge 
("knowing that" and "knowing how") as well as their sensitivity to access and 
performance as base of knowing. The test questions asked in the three experiments are 
summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Test Questions Asked in the Three Experiments 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Knowing That 
Pre-exposure for Self + + + 
Post-exposure for Self + + -
Pre-exposure for Other 1 - + 
Post-exposure for Other 1 + + + 
Post-performance for Other 1 + -
Pre-exposure for Other 2 + + + 
Post-performance for Other 2 + -
Knowing How 
Pre-exposure for Self + + + 
Post-exposure for Self + + -
Pre-exposure for Other 1 - + 
Post-exposure for Other 1 + + + 
Post-performance for Other 1 - + -
Pre-exposure for Other 2 + + + 
Post-performance for Other 2 + -
False Belief 
Pre-exposure for Self + + + 
Post-exposure for Self + + -
Pre-exposure for Other 1 - + 
Post-exposure for Other 1 + + + 
Pre-exposure for Other 2 + + + 
‘‘+，’ represents the presence of that question; ‘‘- ’’ represents the absence of that question. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Experiment 1 
The first step in assessing children's understanding of "knowing how" and 
"knowing that" as a function of access to information is to determine if they are aware that 
pre-exposure to relevant information is associated with "not knowing" whereas after being 
exposed to the information, the person could be claimed to "know." We expected that 
preschool children would gradually have an appreciation of such differences in their states 
of knowing. To test the hypothesis, 3-, 4- and 5-year-old children were asked to judge their 
states of knowing in pre- and post-exposure conditions. Similar questions for others were 
also asked and their responses were compared with that for themselves. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 72 children, half boys and half girls, participated in this experiment. The 
24 3-year-olds ranged in age from 3-1 to 3-11 (mean age = 3.83’ 迎=0.10)，the 24 4-
year-olds ranged from 4-0 to 4-11 years (mean age = 4 .56 ,迎=0.29) and the 24 5-year-
olds ranged from 5-0 to 5-10 (mean age = 5.31, SD= 0.29). All the participants were 
attending middle class kindergartens in Shatin, Hong Kong. Parental consent was collected 
prior to children's participation. This experiment was conducted in a quiet room of the 
kindergarten in which the children met individually with a post-graduate student for about 
10-15 minutes. 
Materials 
For the knowing-that task, a chest of drawers (10.5 x 10.5 x 3.5 cm) was used. The 
drawer contained a candy. Children were asked if they knew the contents of the drawer or 
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not. A Hello Kitty toy acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the contents of the drawer) 
whereas a Doraemon toy acted as the Other 2 (who did not have access to the contents of 
the drawer). 
For the knowing-how task, a set of two magic markers (a green one and a 
transparent one) and a blank piece of paper were used. The transparent marker was used to 
change a line drawn with the green marker into purple. This set of materials was used for a 
"trick" that the child was asked whether he/ she knew how to do it or not. A Winnie- the-
Pooh toy acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the trick) whereas a Tigger toy acted as 
the Other 2 (who did not have access to the trick). 
As for the false belief task ("unexpected contents" task), a cylinder-shaped package 
of Smarties (40 mm diameter x 20 cm height) with a lid was used. The cylinder contained 
two pencils. A McDull toy acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the contents of the 
cylinder), whereas an Ah May toy acted as the Other 2 (who did not have access to the 
contents of the cylinder). 
In addition, there was a set of record sheets (as seen in Appendix A) for marking 
children's responses in the tasks of "knowing that," "knowing how" and "false belief." 
Each child participated in all three tasks (knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief), 
and their order was counterbalanced across children. 
Procedure 
The structures of the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks were designed to be as 
parallel as that of Gopnik and Grafs (1988) source knowledge tasks, but with varied types 
of information: the contents of a set of drawers for the knowing-that tasks and some simple 
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tricks for the knowing-how tasks. Moreover, the focal questions asked also deviated from 
Gopnik and Grafs (1988) design in several ways. 
In both the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks, the target questions were asked 
at two separate phases of the task, which were labeled as "pre-exposure" and "post-
exposure." The pre-exposure questions were aimed at examining children's abilities to 
correctly state that they "did not know" information that they had not been exposed to. 
After the children were given the critical information for the task, they were asked the 
post-exposure questions which were about whether or not they knew the information "right 
now." For the post-exposure questions, if children understand the information given to 
them and are confident of their ability to demonstrate such knowledge, they should claim 
to "know." However, being exposed to information does not guarantee one "knows" it 
(Montgomery, 1992); sometimes the information requires further processing in order to be 
truly known. Thus, other than being asked to state if they "knew" the information or not, 
the children were also asked to demonstrate their knowledge to the experimenter. 
Apart from children's understanding of their own knowledge, their understanding 
of others' states of knowing was also investigated in this experiment. Similarly, there were 
pre-exposure and post-exposure questions for the other. The pre-exposure questions were 
intended to examine children's abilities to correctly state that the other "did not know" 
information if they had not been exposed to it whereas the post-exposure questions were 
designed to examine children's abilities to state that the other "knew" if they had been 
given the critical information for the task. A summary of correct responses at the different 
phrases of the two types of knowing tasks is presented in Table 5, and the details of the 
knowing-that and knowing-how tasks are presented below. 
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Table 5 
Correct Response Pattern for the Questions in Knowing-How and Knowing-That Tasks 
Type of Question Knowing How Knowing That 
Pre-exposure 
Self ——"Do you know?" "Don't know" because "Don't know" because 
probably impossible non-descript container 
Other 2 ——"Does he / she know?" "Don't know" because "Don't know" because 
trick was not revealed he / she didn't have 
to him / her access to the contents 
Post-exposure 
Self "Do you know?" "Know" because trick "Know" because contents 
revealed revealed 
Other 1 "Does he /she know?" "Know" because trick "Know" because contents 
revealed revealed 
(i) Knowing That 
In the knowing-that task, the child was first shown a set of drawers and was asked, 
[Pointing at the drawer] "Do you know what's inside?" At this pre-exposure phrase, if the 
child claimed that he/she "did not know," the experimenter would open the drawer so that 
the child could see the object inside. However, if the child claimed to "know," he /she 
would be asked to name what was in the drawer. If he/ she answered incorrectly, s/he 
would be told, "No, there isn't [X] inside, there is..." and then the experimenter would 
show the contents to him/ her. After the child had seen the object, the drawer was closed 
again. At this post-exposure phrase, the child was asked if he/she "knew" what was in the 
drawer to which s/he was just exposed. If the child claimed to "know," s/he was then asked 
to tell the experimenter what it was to ensure that s/he really knew. 
Once the self-part was finished, Other 1 (with access) was introduced to the child. 
Other 1 was then shown the contents of the drawer. After that, Other 2 (no access) came 
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out and was portrayed as an ignorant bystander. The child was asked the pre-exposure 
questions for other. The child was asked if Other 2 knew what was inside the drawer. 
Since Other 1 had been exposed to the contents of the drawer, the child was then asked the 
post-exposure questions for the other. The child was asked if Other 1 knew what was 
inside the drawer. 
(ii) Knowing How 
The structure of the knowing-how task was identical to that of the knowing-that 
task. The knowing-how task was a trick that the children were presumed not to know how 
to do before being taught by the experimenter. The trick involved changing a green line 
into a purple line (color-changing task). At the beginning of the task, the child was shown 
a piece of paper with a green line drawn on it and the two magic markers (one green and 
one transparent), and was told about the result of the trick. The child was told as follows: 
Here's a line. What color is it (point at line)? Green... right. Do you know how to change 
this green line (point at line again) into purple? 
The child's answers to this pre-exposure question were scored as either "know" or 
"don't know." For this question, children should have answered "don't know," unless they 
actually knew how to perform the trick. If the child claimed to "know," he /she would be 
asked to perform the trick; otherwise, the experimenter would show the child how to 
perform the trick as follows: 
The experimenter used the green pen to draw another line on the paper. Then the 
experimenter picked up the transparent pen and held it out to make it salient to the child 
that the transparent pen had been picked up. At last, the experimenter scribbled over the 
green line and turned it into purple. 
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After the child was shown how to do the trick, he/she was asked if s/he "knew 
how" to perform the trick right now, and this was the post-exposure question. If child 
claimed he/she "knew how" to perform the trick, s/he was asked to perform it. His/her 
performance was coded as either correct or incorrect. If the child said he/she "did not 
know," the experimenter showed him/her how to perform the trick again and the post-
exposure question was asked. Once the child's performance was coded, he/she moved on 
to the other-part. 
For the other-part. Other 1 (with access) was first introduced to the child and it was 
shown how to perform the trick by the experimenter. Then Other 2 (no access) came out. It 
was portrayed as an ignorant bystander. The child was first asked the pre-exposure 
questions for the other. The child was asked if Other 2 knew how to perform the trick. As 
Other 1 had been taught how to perform the trick, the child was then asked the post-
exposure questions for the other. The child was asked if Other 1 knew how to perform the 
trick. 
(iii) False Belief 
The false belief task used in this experiment was the unexpected contents task. The 
child was shown a familiar container of Smarties and asked, "Do you know what's 
inside?" This pre-exposure question is similar to that in the knowing tasks as it asks 
children to make judgment about their own knowledge of the contents of a container that 
they have not been exposed to. However, since the label and shape of the container is 
familiar, children may be confident about the contents of the container. Once the child's 
response was recorded, Other 1 (with access) was introduced to him/her. Then, both the 
child and Other 1 were shown the actual unexpected contents of the container. After being 
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shown the actual contents of the container, the child was asked the post-exposure question 
for self. Thereafter, Other 2 (no access) came out. It was portrayed as ignorant about the 
task and the child was asked if it knew what was inside the container. Following this pre-
exposure question for the other, the child was asked if Other 1 knew what was inside the 
container, and their responses were scored as post-exposure question for the other. 
Results and Discussion 
Pre-Exposure "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" 
Before the children were exposed to either the actual procedure for doing the tricks 
or the contents of the drawers, they were first asked if they "knew" how to do the trick or 
what was inside the drawer. A correct answer to both of these self pre-exposure questions, 
as shown in Table 5，is "don't know," since there is no way for the child to know how to 
do the trick or know the contents of the drawer, unless he/she is guessing. 
As can be seen in Figure 1，children's judgments for their own knowing-how 
tended to get more conservative, and thus more accurate, with increasing age. Since the 
range of this measure was from 0 to 1, the chance level was set as 0.5. One-sample t-tests 
were run for the means numbers of "know" judgments of each age group to test if they are 
significantly above or below chance. It was found that the means for the 4- and 5-year-
olds were significantly below chance for both of the knowing tasks, £S<.05 whereas the 
means for the 3-year-olds were only significantly below chance for the knowing-that task, 
E<.05. 
In order to test children's understanding of others' knowledge, children were asked 
to judge if Other 2, who was not exposed to the actual procedure for doing the tricks, 
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Figure 1. Children's performance on pre-exposure questions for knowing-that and 
knowing-how for self [Experiment 1]. 
"knew" how to do the trick and to judge if Other 2, who did not have access to the 
contents of the drawer, "knew" what was inside the drawer. A correct answer to both of 
these other pre-exposure questions, as shown in Table 5’ is "don't know," since neither 
the trick nor the contents of the drawer were revealed to the puppets. Similar to the pattern 
for children's own knowledge judgment and as can be seen in Figure 2, children's 
judgments for both types of others knowing tended to get more conservative, thus more 
accurate, with increasing age. One sample t-tests were run to test against the chance level 
of 0.5. It was found that the means for the 4- and 5-year-olds, but not for the 3-year-olds, 
were below what would be expected by chance for both of these tasks, 2S<.05. 
In order to compare children's pre-exposure judgments across the two types of 
knowing (knowing-that and knowing-how) and person (self and other), a repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed for the number of "know" judgments in the 
knowing-how and knowing-that tasks by age and gender. The only statistically significant 
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effect was a main effect of age, F(2, 66) = 5.42，』<.01, which means that children's 
judgments for both types of knowing, regardless of person, tended to get more 
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Figure 2. Children's performance on pre-exposure questions for knowing-that and 
knowing-how for other [Experiment 1]. 
Post-exposure “Knowing How" and "Knowing That，’ 
As indicated in Table 5，after being exposed to the method for doing the trick or the 
contents of the drawer, children should answer that they "know" for the post-exposure "do 
you know how/that" questions. In fact, after being shown the trick and being exposed to 
the contents of the drawers, almost all of the children, no matter which age group they 
belonged to, claimed to "know." 
However, to be credited with an understanding of "knowing," children are required 
to differentiate states of knowing from states of "not knowing" (Bartsh & Wellman, 1995). 
If they understand such a difference, children should be able to use the word "know" 
discriminately. Thus, they should claim to "know" more often in the post-exposure 
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questions than in the pre-exposure questions. In order to examine this, a difference score 
between children's answers on both the pre- and post-exposure questions was constructed. 
If children used the word "know" correctly, they should use it only for the post-exposure 
and not the pre-exposure questions. To measure such discriminate use, any judgment of 
"know" was given a score of one and any judgment of "not know" was given a score of 
zero, regardless of the question. Next, the pre-exposure scores were subtracted from the 
post-exposure scores. Thus, if children answered that they "know" correctly in the post-
exposure trial, and that they "don't know" in the pre-exposure trial, they would get a score 
of 1 - 0 =1 for this discriminate knowing measure. Theoretically, scores on this measure 
could vary from +1 to -1 , with a positive score meaning the children said "know" more 
after exposure (appropriate), and a negative score indicating that children said "know" 
more before exposure (inappropriate). As can be seen in Figure 3，the means for this 
measure were all above zero, indicating that even the 3-year-olds were more likely to 
claim knowledge, for both "knowing how" and "knowing that," after exposure to the 
relevant information, than before exposure. 
Apart from children's own states of knowing, children were also asked to judge if 
Other 1，who was exposed to the actual procedure for doing the tricks, "knew" how to do 
the trick; and to judge if Other 1, who had access to the contents of the drawers "knew" 
what was inside the drawer. In order to demonstrate the ability to distinguish "knowing" to 
"not knowing" among others, children should have attributed "know" more often to Other 
1 (who had been exposed to the trick / contents of the drawer) than to Other 2 (who was 
not exposed to either the trick / contents of the drawer). Thus, a difference score, parallel 
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Figure 3. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that and knowing-how (self) [Experiment 1]. 
to the self discriminate knowing score, was constructed from children's attribution of 
knowing to Other 1 and Other 2. If children used the word "know" correctly, they should 
have used it only for Other 1 (exposed) and not for Other 2 (not exposed). To measure 
such discriminate use, any judgment of "know" was given a score of one and any 
judgment of "not know" was given a score of zero, regardless of the question. Next, the 
Other 2 scores were subtracted from the Other 1 scores. Thus, if children answered that 
Other 1 "know" correctly, and that Other 2 "doesn't know", they would get a score of 1 -
0=1 for this discriminate knowing measure. As with the s ^ discriminate knowing 
measures, scores on this measure could vary from +1 to -1，with a positive score 
indicating more (appropriate) use of "know" for Other 1 and a negative score indicating 
more (inappropriate) use of "know" for Other 2. 
As can be seen in Figure 4，the means for this measure are all above zero (chance 
level), indicating that children were more likely to attribute knowledge, for both "knowing 
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how" and "knowing that," to Other 1 (who had access to the relevant information), than 
Other 2 (who did not have access to the relevant information). 
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Figure 4. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that and knowing-how (other 1- other 2) [Experiment 1]. 
In order to compare children's discriminating judgments across the two types of 
knowing (knowing-that and knowing-how) and person (self and other), a repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed for the discriminate knowing score in the 
knowing-how and knowing-that tasks by age and gender. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 
4，children's performance on the discriminate knowing score for both types of knowing 
tended to be more accurate with increasing age, F(2, 65)= 10.94’ 2<.001，and children were 
more accurate with the knowing-that task than they were with the knowing-how task, F(l, 
65)= 4.09, £<.05. Moreover, children were more accurate with self judgment than with 
that of the other, F(l, 65)= 7.99，£<.01. No interactions between any of these factors were 
found. Thus, the discriminate knowing measure was able to demonstrate sensitivity to both 
person (self judgments better than other) and task (knowing-that better than knowing-
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how), with children's judgments of knowing as a function of exposure to information 
becoming more accurate over the preschool years. 
False Belief Tasks 
The self-questions for the unexpected contents task were comparable to that of the 
knowing-how and knowing-that tasks since they asked children to state their own belief 
before and after being exposed to the contents of the Smarties box. Indeed, this false belief 
task could be regarded as a knowing-that task except the label and shape of the Smarties 
cylinder may have given children some clues (though misleading) about the contents. 
Since the appearance of the drawers in the knowing-that task would not give children any 
hints about its contents, children's judgments about their own pre-exposure knowledge in 
the false belief task may have been influenced by this factor. 
As with the knowing-how and knowing-that tasks, before the children were exposed 
to the contents of the Smarties box, the children were first asked if they "knew" what was 
inside the box. For this self pre-exposure question, the "correct" answer is quite 
ambiguous: if the task is regarded as a "real" false belief task, without doubt the correct 
answer should be "know"; however, if it is treated as an alternative knowing-that task, then 
children who answer "don't know" could also be considered as correct since they may 
have doubt or uncertainty about the contents of the Smarties box. Here, the structure of the 
false belief task was designed to be parallel to that of the knowing-that tasks and it was 
aimed at examining children's understanding of knowing rather than thinking. Thus, the 
scoring rules of the knowing-that tasks should be applicable to the false belief task as well. 
As for the other's "pre-exposure" belief, children were asked to judge if Other 2, who did 
not have access to the contents of the Smarties box, "knew" what was inside the box. A 
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correct answer to this other pre-exposure questions is "don't know," since the contents of 
the Smarties box were not revealed to the puppet. Similarly, after being exposed to the 
contents of the Smarties box, children should have answered that they "know" for the self 
post-exposure question. As for the other post-exposure question, children should also have 
answered that Other 1，who was exposed to the contents of the Smarties box, "know" since 
the contents of the box were revealed to him as well. 
In order to compare children's judgments across person (self and other), a repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed for the discriminate scores in the false belief 
task by age and gender. The discriminate score was calculated in the same way as those in 
the knowing-how and knowing-that tasks. That is, any judgment of "know" was given a 
score of one and any judgment of "not know" was given a score of zero, regardless of the 
question. Then, the pre-exposure scores were subtracted from the post-exposure scores. 
Thus, if children answered "know" in the post-exposure trial, and "don't know" in the pre-
exposure trial, they would get a score of 1 - 0 =1 for the discriminate measure. 
Theoretically, scores on this measure could vary from +1 to —1’ with a positive score 
meaning the children said "know" more in the post-exposure question, and a negative 
score indicating that children said "know" more in the pre-exposure question. As can be 
seen in Figures 5, children's tended to claim "know" more in the post-exposure questions, 
with increasing age, F(2, 66)=9.22, £<.001, and there was a age by person interaction, F(2, 
66)=3.17, £<.05, which appears to be located primarily in the 5-year-olds who performed 
much better for others than self judgments while the 3- and 4-year-olds had better 
judgments for s ^ than others. Moreover, except for the 3-year-olds in other's judgments. 
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children's performance, regardless of person, were all significantly above the chance level 
of zero, p<.01. 
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Figure 5. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score in the 
false belief task for self and other [Experiment 1]. 
Overall Performance on Knowing How, Knowing That, and False Belief 
In order to compare children's overall performance across the 3 tasks (knowing 
how, knowing that and false belief), it was important to incorporate a score that would be 
comparable in scale and measure the fundamental aspects of each concept. Thus, the 
discriminate score calculated by subtracting the children's pre-exposure responses from 
their post-exposure responses in each concept seemed to be the best choice. 
Children's discriminate scores for each concept were analyzed together in a 
repeated measures analysis of variance examining the effects of concept, person, age, and 
gender. There was a main effect of age, F(2, 65) = 6.83，2<.001, with children's 
performance increasing steadily with age, and there was a marginally significant effect of 
person, F(l, 65)= 3.69, with children's judgments better for self than other. As can be 
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seen in Figure 6，similar developmental patterns were found in children's performance on 
the self judgment in the knowing-that and the false belief task: the 4-year-olds did the best, 
followed by the 5-year-olds; the 3-year-olds did the worst. Instead, there was a linear 
improvement in children's judgments in the knowing-how task across age. 
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Figure 6. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief (self) [Experiment 1]. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, the 3-year-olds, performance on the other's judgment was 
not significantly above the chance level of zero in the knowing-how and the false belief 
task; however, their performance on the knowing-that task was significantly above the 
chance level of zero, pc.Ol. Children's judgments about the other's "knowing how" and 
"knowing that" were more or less the same among the 4- and 5-year-olds; yet, the 3-year-
olds seemed to have some difficulties in their judgment of the other's "knowing how." 
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Figure 7. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief (other 1 - other 2) [Experiment 1]. 
Using discriminate scores helps make comparisons more valid. However, such 
scores did not reveal pattern of children's error. For example, the same score could result 
from two very different errors: children who scored zero in the discriminate score could 
mean they got the post-exposure answer right but the pre-exposure wrong (i.e., 1-1= 0)，or 
they got the post-exposure answer wrong but the pre-exposure right (i.e., 0-0= 0). In order 
to have an idea about children's pattern of errors. Table 6 showed the number of children 
who responded in particular pattern in the pre- and post-exposure questions. As can be 
seen in Table 6，children who scored zero in the discriminate score were likely getting the 
post-exposure question right but erred in the pre-exposure questions (i.e., 1-1= 0). 
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Inferring from this, children seemed to have more difficulty in understanding pre-exposure 
state of knowing than they were in post-exposure state. 
Table 6 
Number of Children Resvondim in Pre- and Post-Exposure Questions [Experiment 1] 
Self Other 
Age Age 
3 4 5 3 4 5 
Knowing How 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 12 14 21 5 13 19 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 3 6 6 1 
K - K (1-1 =0) 10 6 3 10 4 3 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 1 3 1 1 
Knowing That 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 14 22 17 10 13 20 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 4 1 1 5 4 1 
K - K (1-1 =0) 5 1 6 8 6 2 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 1 1 1 1 
False Belief 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 10 17 14 9 15 22 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 - 1 5 5 -
K - K (1-1 =0) 12 7 9 7 4 2 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 1 3 
"D" represents "don't know"; "K" represents "know." 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1，children demonstrated their sensitivity to access to information as 
a basis of knowing. In Experiment 2，children's understanding of knowing was examined « 
in terms of performance and access. The structures of the tasks were basically the same as 
those adopted in Experiment 1，except performances of other were included and the false 
belief task adopted here was really a test of false belief. In order to test the possibility that 
children's attribution of knowledge was mainly based on performance rather than access to 
relevant information, children were asked to judge others，state of knowing after 
performances were shown. If children vary their answers about a person's knowledge as a 
function of the person's performance, they would attribute knowledge more often to 
people who showed successful performance. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 72 children, half boys and half girls, participated in this experiment. The 
24 3-year-olds ranged in age from 3-1 to 3-11 (mean age = 3.71，迎=0.22), the 24 4-
year-olds ranged from 4-0 to 4-11 years (mean age = 4 .50 ,坠=0 .26 ) and the 24 5-year-
olds ranged from 5-0 to 5-10 (mean age = 5.37，SD= 0.23). All the participants were 
attending middle class kindergartens in Shatin, Hong Kong. Forty-seven of the participants 
had participated in Experiment 1 earlier, but the two experiments were conducted at least a 
month apart. This experiment was conducted in a quiet room of the kindergarten in which 
the children were interviewed by a post-graduate student. The children were tested 
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individually for about 15-20 minutes. Parental consent was collected prior to children's 
participation. 
Materials 
For the knowing-that tasks, a chest of drawers (10.5 x 10.5 x 3.5 cm each) was 
used. The upper drawer contained an eraser while the lower drawer contained a toy car. 
Children were asked if they knew the contents of the drawers or not. For the first trial, a 
Hello Kitty toy acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the contents of the drawer) 
whereas a Doraemon toy acted as the Other 2 (who did not have access to the contents of 
the drawer). For the second trial, a Mickey Mouse toy acted as the Other 1 whereas a 
Goofey toy acted as the Other 2. 
For the knowing-how tasks, There were two sets of materials: (1) a toy with plastic 
ants inside (Moving Ants task); the ants inside could be moved by pulling the button in the 
back of the toy forward and backward (2) a toy with eyes that could flash (Flashing Eyes 
task) when its tail was pulled. Each set of materials was used for a "trick" that the child was 
asked whether he/ she knew how to do it or not. For the Moving Ants task, a Doraemon toy 
acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the trick) whereas a Hello Kitty toy acted as the 
Other 2 (who did not have access to the trick). For the Flashing Eyes task, a Goofey toy 
acted as the Other 1 whereas a Mickey Mouse acted as the Other 2. 
As for the false belief task (the "unexpected contents" task), a box of colored 
pencils was used. The box contained bandages. A McDull toy acted as the Other 1 (who • 
had access to the contents of the box) whereas the Ah May toy acted as the Other 2 (who 
did not have access to the contents of the box). 
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In addition, there was a set of record sheets (as seen in Appendix B) for marking 
children's responses in the tasks of "knowing that," "knowing how” and "false belief.” 
Each child participated in all three tasks (knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief) and 
their order was counterbalanced across children. 
Procedure 
In both the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks, the target questions were asked 
at three separate phases of the task: pre-exposure, post-exposure and post-performance. 
Since it is difficult to control children's successfulness in doing a particular task, an 
experimental target's successfulness in performance is preferred as it can be easier to 
manipulate. As in Experiment 1，the pre-exposure and post-exposure questions were asked 
for both s ^ and other: whilst the post-performance questions were asked for other only. 
Details of the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks are presented below. 
(i) Knowing That 
The procedure for the knowing-that task for ^ was identical to that in Experiment 
1. Before the child had access to the contents of the drawers, he/she was asked the pre-
exposure question for self: after being shown the contents, he/she was asked the post-
exposure question for s ^ . After that. Other 1 was introduced to the child and it was shown 
the contents of the drawers. Since the Other 1 had been exposed to the contents, 
exposure question for other were asked. Then, the experimenter would turn to Other 1 and 
ask if it knew the contents of the drawer. The Other 1 would then whispered to the 
experimenter and the experimenter would reply, "I see." If it was the condition of 
successful action，the experimenter would tell the child, “ (Other l)said there's a(n) 
[eraser / toy car] inside." If it was the condition of failure action, the experimenter would 
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tell the child, “ (Other 1) said there's a [ruler / comb] inside." Being told about the 
responses of Other 1, the child was asked if Other 1 knew what was inside the drawers. 
This was the post-performance question for Other 1. Once the child's response was 
recorded, he/she proceeded to the questions for Other 2. 
Other 2 was portrayed as an ignorant bystander. The experimenter asked the child 
if Other 2 knew what was inside the drawer. Since Other 2 had not been exposed to the 
contents, the pre-exposure questions for other were asked. Then, the experimenter would 
turn to Other 2 and ask if it knew the contents of the drawer. Again, the Other 2 whispered 
to the experimenter and the experimenter would reply, "I see." For the condition of 
successful action, the experimenter would tell the child, "Other 2 said there's a(n) [eraser / 
toy car] inside." As for the condition of failure action, the experimenter would tell the 
child, "Other 2 said there's a [ruler / comb] inside." The post-performance question for 
Other 2 was then asked of the child. Since the performance condition was a within-
subjects manipulation, all children received two trials in total, one trial in each of the 
success and the failure conditions for the Other 1 and the Other 2 respectively, with the 
pairing of conditions to drawers counterbalanced across participants. 
(ii) Knowing How 
The knowing-how tasks consisted of two simple tricks that children were presumed 
not to know how to do before being taught by the experimenter. One of the tricks involved 
making the plastic ants inside a toy move while the other trick involved making the eyes of 
a toy flash. Each child received both tasks and their order was counterbalanced across 
children. The procedure for the knowing-how task for s ^ was identical to that in 
Experiment 1. Before the child had access to the tricks, he/she was asked the pre-exposure 
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question for self: after being shown how to perform the trick, s/he was asked the post-
exposure questions for self. As for the other-part, the structure was identical to that of the 
knowing-that task. 
For the other-part. Other 1 was introduced to the child and it was taught how to 
perform the tricks. Since the Other 1 had been exposed to the tricks, the post-exposure 
question for other was asked. Then, the experimenter asked the Other 1 if it knew how to 
perform the tricks. The Other 1 then whispered to the experimenter and the experimenter 
would reply, "I see. Maybe you can try to do it." If it was the condition of successful 
action, the experimenter held the hand of the Other 1 and performed the tricks by pulling 
the button behind the toy forward and backward (Moving Ants task) or pulling on the tail 
of the toy (Flashing Eyes task). If it was the condition of the failure action, the 
experimenter would hold the Other 1 walking around on the table without pulling the 
button behind the toy (Moving Ants task) or touching the eyes of the toy without pulling 
the tail of the toy (Flashing Eyes task). Being shown the performances of the Other 1, the 
child was asked if the Other 1 knew how to perform the trick and this was the post-
performance question for Other 1. Once children's responses were recorded, they 
proceeded to the questions for the Other 2. 
Other 2 was portrayed as an ignorant bystander and the experimenter asked the 
child if Other 2 knew how to perform the tricks. Since Other 2 had not been exposed to the 
tricks, the pre-exposure questions for other were asked. Then, the experimenter turned to 
Other 2 and asked if it knew how to perform the tricks. Again, the Other 2 whispered to 
the experimenter and the experimenter would reply, "I see. Maybe you can try to do it." 
For the condition of the successful action, the experimenter would hold the hand of the 
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Other 2 and perform the tricks by pulling the button behind the toy forward and backward 
(Moving Ants task) or pulling on the tail of the toy (Flashing Eyes task). If it was in the 
condition of the failure action, the experimenter would hold the Other 2 walking around on 
the table (Moving Ants task) or touching the eyes of the (Flashing Eyes task). After the 
performances of Other 2 were demonstrated, the post-performance question for Other 2 
was asked. 
(iii) False Belief 
The false-belief task used in this experiment was the unexpected contents task. The 
child was shown a familiar box of colored pencils and asked, "Do you know what's 
inside?" This pre-exposure question for self was identical to that in the Experiment 1. 
Since the label and shape of the box were familiar, almost all of the children responded 
with the actual contents. Once the child's responses were recorded, he/she was then shown 
the actual unexpected contents (bandages) of the box. After being shown the contents, 
he/she was asked the about the post-exposure question for self. In addition, he/she was 
asked the false belief test question, "before I open this for you to have a look, do you know 
what's inside this box?" This question requires children to make judgments of their own 
prior knowledge state. 
Apart from the self-judgment, children were also asked to make judgments about 
the other in the false belief task. Other 1 (with access) was first introduced to the children 
and it was shown the actual unexpected contents of the colored pencils box. After that, 
children were asked the post-exposure question for other. Thereafter, Other 2 (no access) 
came out. It was portrayed as ignorant about the task. The child was told that Other 2 had 
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never seen inside the box, and asked if it knew what was inside the box. This was the pre-
exposure question for other. 
Results and Discussion 
Discriminate Measure of ‘‘Knowing How’，，"Knowing That，， 
Replicating Experiment 1 with a new sample, a repeated measures analysis of 
variance was performed for the discriminate knowing score in the knowing-how and 
knowing-that tasks for both self and other by age and gender. The discriminate knowing 
score was calculated as those in Experiment 1: any judgment of "know" was given a score 
of one and any judgment of "not know" was given a score of zero, regardless of the 
question. Next, the pre-exposure scores were subtracted from the post-exposure scores. 
Thus, if children answered that they "know" correctly in the post-exposure trial, and that 
they "don't know" in the pre-exposure trial, they would get a score of 1 - 0 =1 for this 
discriminate knowing measure. Theoretically, scores on this measure could vary from +1 to 
-1，with a positive score meaning the children said "know" more after exposure 
(appropriate), and a negative score indicating that children said "know" more before 
exposure (inappropriate). As can be seen in Figures 8 and 9, similar to what was found in 
Experiment 1，children's performance on the discriminate knowing score for both types of 
knowing tended to be more accurate with increasing age, £(2, 57) = 12.48, £<.001. As 
Experiment 1 demonstrated, children's judgments were better for s ^ than other, F(l, 57)= 
15.43, £<.001, and were more accurate with the knowing-that task than with the knowing-
how task, F(l, 57) = 3.91, £<.05. However, unlike Experiment 1, two other interaction 
effects also became evident in this experiment. The first one was a person by age interaction, 
F(2, 57) = 4.02, 2<.05, which as can be seen in the Figures, appeared to be located in the 5-
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year-olds who performed much better for other in the knowing-that task. Second, there 
was a concept by age interaction, F(2, 57) = 3.49，£<.05, which can be seen in Figure 8, 
seemed to be located in the 5-year-olds whose judgments were better in the 
knowing-how task than in the knowing-that task. 
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Figure 8. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that and knowing-how (self) [Experiment 2], 
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Figure 9. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that and knowing-how (Other 1- Other 2) [Experiment 2]. 
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Performance as an Indicator for Knowing 
In order to investigate whether children would regard access or performance as an 
indicator of knowing, Other 1 (who had access to the tricks and the contents of the drawers) 
and Other 2 (who did not have access to the tricks and the contents of the drawers) were 
manipulated to have either successful or failed performances for each knowing-how and 
knowing-that task. In other words, as shown in Table 7，there were four conditions for 
each type of knowing and they were counterbalanced among children. 
Table 7 
Conditions for the "KnowingHow" and "Knowing That" Tasks 
Other 1 Other 2 
Access Performance Access Performance 
Condition 1 + + - -
Condition 2 + + - + 
Condition 3 + - -
Condition 4 + - - + 
‘‘+，，represents the presence of access / success in performance; ‘‘-，，represents the absence 
of access / failure in performance. 
(i) Successful Performance 
After the performance of Other 1 (with access) was shown, children were asked if 
the Other 1 “knew’，how to do the trick or what was inside the drawer again. In the 
condition of successful performance, an expected answer to this post-performance 
question, is "know," since Other 1 had the access to information and successful 
performance was demonstrated. As can be seen in Figure 10’ almost all of the children. 
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regardless of their age, attributed knowledge (knowing-how and knowing-that) to the 
Other 1 after being shown a successful performance. 
d f l j -
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Figure 10. Children's Attribution of "Know" to Other 1 (with access) after Successful 
Performance in Knowing That and Knowing How Tasks [Experiment 2]. 
Similarly, after the performance of Other 2 (no access) was shown, children were 
asked if the Other 2 "knew" how to do the trick or the contents of the drawer. The 
implication of children's answer to this post-performance question was somehow 
different from what was stated above. Since the Other 2 did not have access to the relevant 
information，after being shown a successful performance，if children attributed knowledge 
to the Other 2, then the children probably attributed knowledge based on other's 
performance without regarding the factor of access to information. On the other hand, if 
the children took both access to information and successful action into consideration when 
they attributed knowledge to others, then the children should claim the Other 2 as “doesn't 
know." As can be seen in Figure 11，almost all of the children, regardless their age， 
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attributed knowledge (knowing-how and knowing-that) to the Other 2 after being shown a 
successful performance. 
In order to compare children's judgments of other's knowledge across the two types 
of access (with access and without access) and performance (successful and failed), a 
repeated measures analysis of variance was performed for the number of "know" 
judgments in the knowing-how and knowing-that tasks by age and gender. There was a 
main effect of performance, F(l, 66) = 349.36, £<.001, which indicated that children's 
judgment of other's knowledge were mainly based on performance: whenever the puppet 
demonstration a successful action, regardless of whether it has access to the relevant 
information or not, children would attribute "know." 
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Figure 11, Children's attribution of "know" to other 2 (no access) after successful 
performance in knowing that and knowing how tasks [Experiment 2]. 
(ii) Failed Performance 
After being shown a failed performance, no matter whether the puppet had or did not 
have access to the trick or the contents of the drawer, children were expected to claim that 
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other "don't know" for the post-performance question. As can be seen in Figures 12 and 13, 
the means for the 4- and 5-year-olds were significantly below chance level of 0.5 for the 
knowing-that tasks, regardless of whether these were with (Other 1) or without access (Other 
2), £S< .05. Moreover, the mean for the 5-year-olds for the Other 2 (no access) in the 
knowing-how task was also significantly below chance, 2<.05. However, the mean for the 3-
year-olds was only significantly below chance for the Other 1 (with access) in the knowing-
how task. 
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Figure 12. Children's attribution of "know" to other 1 (with access) after failed 
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Figure 13. Children's attribution of "know" to other 2 (no access) after failed 
performance in knowing that and knowing how tasks [Experiment 2]. 
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However, being able to have an appropriate attribution of knowledge to others, 
children are required to differentiate other's successful performance from the failed ones. 
If they understanding such a difference, children should be able to use the word "know" 
discriminately. Thus, they should attribute "know" more often for the one with successful 
performance than those with failed performance. In order to examine this, a difference 
score between children's answers on the post-performance questions for the puppets who 
demonstrated successful and failed performance was constructed. If children attribute 
"know" correctly, they should only attribute knowledge to those who showed successful 
performance but not those with failed performance. To measure such discriminate use, any 
attribution of "know" in the post-performance questions was given a score of one and any 
attribution of "not know" was given a score of zero. Next, the post-performance score of 
the successful puppet was subtracted from that of the failed puppet. Thus, if children 
attributed "know" correctly to the puppet who had successful performance, and that they 
attribute "don't know" to the puppet who had failed performance, they would get a score 
of 1 - 0 = 1 for this discriminate performance measure. Since there were two tasks for each 
type of knowing (knowing-how and knowing-that), theoretically, scores on this measure 
could vary from +2 to -2 , with a positive score meaning the children attributed "know" 
more to those who showed a successful performance (appropriate), and a negative score 
indicating that children attributed "know" more to those who showed failed performance 
(inappropriate). As can be seen in Figure 14，the means for this measure were above zero, 
indicating that children were more likely to attribute knowledge to those who 
demonstrated successful performance for both "knowing how" and "knowing that." 
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Figure 14. Children's performance on discriminate success versus failure score for 
knowing-that and knowing-how for others [Experiment 2]. 
In order to compare children's discriminating attribution across the two types of 
knowing (knowing-that and knowing-how), a repeated measures analysis of variance was 
performed for the discriminate performance score in the knowing-how and knowing-that 
tasks by age and gender. There was a main effect of concept, £(1 ’ 66) = 6.84, £<.05, which 
indicated that children's attribution of knowledge to others were more accurate with the 
knowing-that task than they were with the knowing-how task. 
False Belief Task 
The false belief task adopted here was different from the one used in the 
Experiment 1 as it was a "real" false belief task- the children were asked, "before I open 
this for you to have a look, do you know what's inside this box?" A correct answer for \ \s false belief test question is "don't know," since b fore eing shown about the unexpected c nt n s, children should not know what xactly i side the box. Children who 
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answered this/a/5^ belief test question correctly was given a score of one whereas those 
answered it wrongly was given a score of zero. Children's performance on ihxs false belief 
test question was comparable to their performance on pre- and post-exposure questions for 
self, and they gave us different views of children's understanding of knowing. The pre-
and post-exposure questions for self revealed children's understanding of current states of 
knowing whereas the false belief score indicated children's understanding of their prior 
state of knowing. For the pre- and post-exposure questions, children who claimed "know" 
was given a score of one whereas those claimed "don't know" was given a score of zero. 
In order to compare children's understanding of their current and prior states of knowing, a 
repeated measures analysis of variance was performed for the three scores by age and 
gender. As can be seen in Figure 15, children's performance on the three questions become 
better with increasing age, F(l, 62)= 4.86’ 2<.05. Moreover, a main effect of question was 
found in this experiment, F(2, 62)= 18.59, £<.001, with children's performance in the post-
exposure question better than they were in the pre-exposure question and the false belief 
test question. Furthermore, there was an age by question interaction, F(4, 62)= 2.61, £<.05, 
which appears to be located in the 5-year-olds who performed better for the false belief test 
question than the pre-exposure question for self. In short, children's understanding of 
current state of knowing seemed to be better than their understanding of prior state of 
knowing. 
In order to compare children's judgments across person (self and other), a repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed for the discriminate scores in the false belief 
task by age and gender. The discriminate score was calculated by the same system as those 
in Experiment 1. That is, any judgment of "know" was given a score of one and any 
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Figure 15. Children's performance on pre-exposure, post-exposure score (self) and false 
belief test question [Experiment 2]. 
judgment of "not know" was given a score of zero, regardless of the question. Next, the 
pre-exposure scores were subtracted from the post-exposure scores. Thus, if children 
answered "know" in the post-exposure trial, and "don't know" in the pre-exposure trial, 
they would get a score of 1 - 0 = 1 for the discriminate measure. Theoretically, scores on 
this measure could vary from +1 to -1’ with a positive score meaning the children said 
"know" more in the post-exposure question, and a negative score indicating that children 
said "know" more in the pre-exposure question. Although the Figure 16 seemed to show 
that children's performance on discriminate scores was better for other than self, none of 
the age, gender, person effects, nor their interactions, were significant and the means for 
the 4-and 5-year-olds in both s ^ and other were above the chance level of zero, £S<.05. 
These findings were different from that of Experiment 1，which main effect of age and the 
interaction between age and person were found. 
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Figure 16. Children's performance on discriminate scores for self and other in false belief 
task [Experiment 2]. 
Overall Performance on Knowing How. Knowing That, and False Belief 
As can be seen in Table 8, children's pattern of errors in answering the pre- and 
post-exposure questions was similar to that of Experiment 1. Children got the pre-
exposure questions wrong more often than they erred in the post-exposure questions. As in 
Experiment 1, children's performances on the discriminate measures across the 3 concepts 
(knowing how, knowing that and false belief) were analyzed together in a repeated 
measures analysis of variance examining the effects of concept, person, age, and gender. 
Similar to what was found in Experiment 1，there was a main effect of age, F(2, 57) = 6.64， 
2<.01, with children's performance increasing steadily with age, and there was a 
marginally significant effect of person, F(l , 57)= 3.62, £<.05, with children's judgments 
better for self than other. Unlike Experiment 1，a main effect of concept was also found in 
this experiment, F(l , 57) = 53.49, £<.001, with children's performance in the knowing-
how and knowing-that tasks better than they were in the false belief task. Moreover, there 
Children's Understanding of Knowing 42 
Table 8 
Number of Children Responding in Pre- and Post-Exposure Questions f Experiment 21 
Self Other 
Age Age 
3 4 5 3 4 5 
Knowing How [Moving Ants] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 13 17 20 8 13 20 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 6 5 3 
K - K (1-1 =0) 11 3 9 5 1 
D - K (0-1 =-1) - 1 1 -
Knowing How [Flashing Eyes] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 12 16 20 5 14 18 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 5 4 3 
K - K (1-1 =0) 12 7 4 10 6 3 
D - K (0-1 =-1) - 4 - -
Knowing That [Drawer A] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 18 19 22 7 13 20 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 1 5 5 3 
K - K (1-1 =0) 4 4 1 1 1 6 1 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 1 1 
Knowing That [Drawer B] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0=1) 17 18 17 11 13 23 
D - D (0-0 = 0) - 4 4 1 
K - K (1-1 =0) 7 5 6 8 7 -
D - K (0-1 =-1) - 1 
False Belief 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0= 1) 9 7 5 6 12 12 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 2 1 6 5 10 
K - K (1-1 =0) 11 15 18 1 1 5 2 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 3 1 2 -
"D" represents "don't know"; "K" represents "know." 
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were three interactions between the factors were found. The first one is the age by concept 
interaction, F(2, 57) = 7.57，e<.01, which as can be seen in Figures 17，the 3-year-olds 
performed better in the knowing-that task than in the knowing-how task for whereas the 5-
year-olds performed better in the knowing-how task than in the knowing-that task. Second 
is the age by person interaction, F(2, 57) = 4.12，E<.05, which appears to be located in the 
4- and 5-year-olds who performed better for other than ^ in the false belief task. The 
third interaction is the one between concept and person，F(l, 57) = 11.78’ p< .01, as can be 
seen in Figures 17 and 18, the self judgments were better in the knowing-how and 
knowing-that tasks; however, the 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated better other judgment in 
the false belief task while the 3-year-olds did more or less the same in self and other 
judgment. 
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Figure 17. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief (self) [Experiment 2]. 
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Figure 18. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief (other 1 -other 2) [Experiment 2]. 
In Experiment 1，the discriminate measures demonstrated children's sensitivity to 
the access to information as a base for knowing judgment. However, this experiment 
showed that when performance was taken into consideration as well, children's judgments 
were probably based on performance, rather than the access to information. The children 
always had had access to the relevant information in both Experiments 1 and 2. In 
Experiment 3, children's knowing judgments when they were ignorant of such information 
were examined. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Experiment 3 
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2，this experiment focused on children's understanding 
of others' states of knowing, given their own ignorance of certain information. Although 
children's understanding of the other's knowledge was tested in Experiment 1 and 2, it 
was always tested after the children themselves knew, and, thus, any difference between 
self and other could have been attributable to children's own knowledge. Moreover, we 
intended to determine whether the pre- and post-exposure questions were asked about the 
same other figure (Other 1) would replicate the results of Experiment 1 and 2. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 72 children, half boys and half girls, participated in this experiment. 
There were 24 at each age group. The 3-year-olds ranged in age from 3-1 to 3-11 (mean 
age = 3.56，迎=0.35)，the 4-year-olds ranged from 4-0 to 4-11 years (mean age = 4.59, 
SD = 0.20) and the 5-year-olds ranged from 5-0 to 5-10 (mean age = 5.51，型=0.29). 
None of the participants had taken part in either Experiment 1 or 2. All the participants 
were attending middle class kindergartens in Shatin, Hong Kong. This experiment was 
conducted in a quiet room of the kindergarten in which the children were interviewed by a 
post-graduate student. The children were tested individually for about 10-15 minutes. 
Parental consent was collected prior to children's participation. 
Materials 
For the knowing-that task, a chest of drawers (10.5 x 10.5 x 3.5 cm each) was used. 
The upper drawer contained a candy while the lower drawer contained a toy car. Children 
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were asked if they knew the contents of the drawers or not. For the first trial, a Doraemon 
toy acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the contents of the drawer) whereas a Hello 
Kitty toy acted as the Other 2 (who did not have access to the contents of the drawer). For 
the second trial, a Forever Friend toy acted as the Other 1 whereas a Mifify toy acted as the 
Other 2. 
For the knowing-how task, there were two sets of materials: (1) a toy with eyes that 
could flash (2) a set of two magic markers (a green one and a transparent one) and a blank 
piece of paper. Each set of materials was used for the "trick" that the child was asked if he/ 
she knew how to do it or not. For the Flashing Eyes task, a Garfield toy acted as the Other 
1 (who had access to the trick) whereas a Snoopy toy acted as the Other 2 (who did not 
have access to the trick). For the Color Changing task, a Tigger toy acted as the Other 1 
whereas a Winnie-tlie-Pooh acted as the Other 2. 
For the false belief tasks, there were two sets of materials: ( l ) a cylinder-shaped 
package of Smarties with a lid and two pencils inside. (2) a box of colored pencils with 
bandages inside. A McDull toy acted as the Other 1 (who had access to the contents of the 
cylinder) whereas an Ah May toy acted as the Other 2 (who did not have access to the 
contents of the cylinder) in the Smarties task. A Goofey toy acted as the Other 1 whereas a 
Mickey Mouse toy acted as the Other 2 in the Colored Pencils task. 
In addition, there was a set of record sheets (as seen in Appendix C) for marking 
children's responses in the tasks of "knowing that," "knowing how" and "false belief” 
Each child participated in all three tasks (knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief) and 
their order was counterbalanced across children. 
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Procedure 
The structure of the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks was different from those 
in Experiments 1 and 2. In this experiment, children did not have access to either the 
contents of the drawers or the tricks. In other words, the role of the children was like that 
of the Other 2 (the one without access to the relevant information). Moreover, no 
performances of the other were included. In the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks, 
both the pre- and post-exposure questions were asked for the Other 1 ； however, only the 
pre-exposure questions were asked of the self and the Other 2. Details of the knowing-that 
and knowing-how tasks are presented below. 
(i) Knowing That 
In the knowing-that tasks, the child was first shown a set of drawers and the Other 
1 was introduced to him/her. The child was then asked, "Does (Other 1) know 
what's inside?" [Pointing at the drawer] This was the pre-exposure question for Other 1. 
After that, only the Other 1 was shown the contents of the drawer and the child was again 
asked if the Other 1 knew what was inside the drawer. This was the post-exposure question 
for the Other 1. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the Other 2 then came out, as an ignorant 
bystander who had never seen inside the drawer. The child was then asked the pre-
exposure questions for both the Other 2 and the Each child received two trials which 
differed in the order of test questions being asked after the Other 1 was shown the contents 
of the drawers. One of the trials was in the order of the self pre-exposure question 
followed by the Other 1 post-exposure question and the Other 2 pre-exposure question; 
another trial was in the order of the Other 1 post-exposure question followed by the pre-
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exposure question for the Other 2 and the self. The pairings of orders to drawers were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
(ii) Knowing How 
The structure of the knowing-how tasks was identical to that of the knowing-that 
tasks. The knowing-how tasks were tricks that the children were presumed not to know 
how to do before being taught by the experimenter. The tricks involved changing a green 
line into a purple line (color-changing task) and making the eyes of a toy flash (flashing-
eye task). At the beginning of the task, the child was shown the materials for the trick and 
he/she was introduced the Other 1. The child was then asked if the Other 1 knew how to 
perform the trick. This was the pre-exposure question for the Other 1. Then, the Other 1 
was shown how to perform the trick out of sight of the child. After that, the child was 
asked about the post-exposure question for the Other 1. Thereafter, the Other 2 was 
brought out as an ignorant bystander and the child was asked about the pre-exposure 
questions for both the Other 2 and the 碰 .A s in the knowing-that tasks, the two knowing-
how tasks differed in the order of test questions asked and the pairings of orders to tricks 
were counterbalanced across participants. 
(iii) False Belief 
Two unexpected contents tasks were used in this experiment. At the beginning of 
the task, the child was either shown a familiar container of Smarties or a box of colored 
pencils. After the Other 1 had been introduced to the child, he/she was asked the pre-
exposure question of the Other 1. Then, the Other 1 was shown the actual contents of the 
containers. Later, the child was asked about the post-exposure question for the Other 1，the 
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pre-exposure question for the Other 2 as well as the pre-exposure question for the self. 
Once again, the pairings of orders to tasks were counterbalanced across participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Pre-Exposure "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" 
At the very beginning of each task, unlike Experiment 1 and 2, children were first 
asked to judge if Other 1，who had not yet been exposed to the relevant information, 
"knew" how to do the trick or "knew" what was inside the drawers. A correct answer to 
these Other 1 pre-exposure questions, is "don't know," since neither the tricks nor the 
contents of the drawer were revealed to the puppets. As can be seen in Figure 19， 
children's judgments for Other 1 in both types of knowing tended to get more 
conservative, and thus more accurate, with increasing age. Since there were two tasks for 
each type of knowing, number of "know" judgments could be ranged from 0 to 2. 
Therefore, the chance level was set as 1. As in Experiment 1，the means for the 4- and 5-
year-olds were below what would be expected by chance for both of these tasks, £S<.05; 
however, different from what was found in Experiment 1，the mean for the 3-year-olds was 
significantly above chance for both of the tasks, 2S<.01. 
In order to investigate whether children have better knowledge judgments of others 
when they themselves are uninformed of the true state of affairs (Experiment 3) than when 
they themselves are informed about the true state of affairs (Experiment 1), children's 
performance on the pre-exposure question for others in Experiment 3 was compared with 
that in Experiment 1. Independent samples t-tests were performed for the number of 
"know" judgment in the pre-exposure questions for others in the knowing-how and 
knowing-that tasks of Experiment 1 and 3. No significant differences were found between 
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children's performance on pre-exposure questions for others in Experiment 1 and 3. In 
other words, there was no evidence that children are better at knowledge judgment of 
others when they are uninformed of the true state of affair. 
Apart from the Other 1, children were also asked the pre-exposure questions for the 
Other 2 and the children themselves, who were not exposed to the relevant information. 
Again, the correct answer to these pre-exposure questions, is "don't know," since neither 
the tricks nor the contents of the drawers were revealed to the children and puppets. As can 
be seen in Figure 20 and Figure 21, a similar pattern was found for children's performance 
on the pre-exposure questions for the Other 2 and themselves: their performance tended to 
get more accurate with increasing age. Similar to what was found for the Other 1, the 
means for 3-year-olds in both tasks were significantly above chance whereas those for the 
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Figure 19. Children's performance on pre-exposure questions for knowing-that and 
knowing- how (other 1) [Experiment 3]. 




I I 、、， ：； 
O 
^ 1 ! , 、 • Knowing That 
• Knowing How 
0 I wKtttKKL J 
3 4 5 
Age 
Figure 20. Children's Performance on Pre-Exposure Questions for Knowing-That and 
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Figure 21. Children's performance on pre-exposure questions for knowing-that and 
knowing-how (self) [Experiment 3]. 
In order to compare children's pre-exposure judgments across the two types of 
knowing (knowing-that and knowing-how) and three kinds of person (Self, Other 1，and 
Other 2), a repeated measures analysis of variance was performed for the number of 
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"know" judgments in the knowing-how and knowing-that tasks by age and gender. As 
Experiment 1 found, there was a main effect of age, F(2, 66)= 47.90, £<.001, with 
children's performance increasing with age. In addition, children participated in this 
experiment were found to be more accurate with the knowing-that tasks than they were 
with the knowing-how tasks, F(l, 66)= 22.27, £<.001, and they were more accurate with 
Other 1 judgments than they were with Other 2 and self judgments, F(l, 66)= 11.83, 
£<.01. 
Overall Performance on Knowing How，Knowing That, and False belief 
As can be seen in Table 9，children's pattern of errors in answering the pre- and post-
exposure questions was similar to that of Experiment 1 and 2. Children's performance in 
post-exposure was better than they were in pre-exposure questions. In other words, children 
erred in pre-exposure questions more often than they were in post-exposure questions. 
Table 9 
Number of Children Responding in Pre- and Post-Exposure Questions�Experiment 3] 
Other 
Age 
3 4 5 
Knowing How [Changing Color] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0=1) 4 11 22 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 3 2 -
K - K (1-1 =0) 17 10 2 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 1 
Knowing How [Flashing Eyes] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0=1) 5 17 20 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 2 -
K - K (1-1=0) 15 5 4 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 3 
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Table 9 (Con't) 
Number of Children Responding in Pre- and Post-Exposure Questions [Experiment 31 
Other 
Age 
3 4 5 
Knowing That [Drawer A] 
Post - Pre rDiscriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0=1) 2 16 21 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 2 5 1 
K - K (1-1 = 0) 17 3 2 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 3 - -
Knowing That [Drawer B] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0=1) 8 16 23 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 1 3 1 
K - K (1-1=0) 15 5 -
D - K (0-1 =-1) - - -
False Belief [Smarties box] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0=1) 3 7 11 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 4 9 5 
K - K (1-1=0) 14 6 4 
D - K (0-1=-1) 3 2 4 
False Belief [Colored pencil box] 
Post - Pre (Discriminate Score) 
K - D (1-0 = 1) 3 8 16 
D - D (0-0 = 0) 2 9 2 
K - K (1-1=0) 16 4 4 
D - K (0-1 =-1) 3 3 2 
"D" represents "don't know"; "K" represents "know." — 
In this experiment, since only the Other 1 was exposed to the relevant information, 
the discriminate knowing scores were solely available for the Other 1. The discriminate 
knowing scores were calculated by giving a score of one to any judgment of "know" and a 
score of zero to any judgment of "not know," regardless of the question. Next, the pre-
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exposure scores were subtracted from the post-exposure scores. Theoretically，scores on 
this measure could vary from +2 to -2 , with a positive score meaning the children said 
"know" more after exposure (appropriate), and a negative score indicating that children 
said "know" more before exposure (inappropriate). With the aim of comparing children's 
performance across the 3 concepts (knowing how, knowing that, and false belief), the 
discriminate knowing scores for Other 1 were analyzed together in a repeated measures 
analysis of variance examining the effects of concept, age, and gender. Similar to 
Experiments 1 and 2, a main effect of age was found, F(2,66)= 31.47, E< 001，with 
children's performance increasing with age. As can be seen in Figure 22, similar to what 
was found in Experiment 2, a main effect of concept was found in this experiment, F( l , 
66)== 21.38，E<.001, with children's performance in the knowing-how and knowing-that 
tasks better than they were in the false belief task, regardless of children's age. 
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Figure 22. Children's performance on discriminate post versus pre-exposure score for 
knowing-that, knowing-how and false belief (other 1) [Experiment 3]. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
General Discussion 
In general, children's understandings of "knowing how" and "knowing that" 
appears to be better for themselves than they were with others in our study. This finding is 
importance because it shows a self-other difference for early understandings of knowing. 
However, the pattern of the self-other difference may be different when the children are 
ignorant about the relevant information. Despite various variations in tasks, our results do 
replicate previous findings of children have better understanding of "knowing that" than 
"knowing how," regardless of self or other. Not surprisingly, the results of the present 
study reveal a developmental progression in children's understanding of "knowing how" 
and "knowing that" for both self and other. There is no consistent relation between gender 
and children's performance across tasks. Furthermore, children's theory of knowing seem 
to proceed from an early sense of distinctive use of performance outcome to later 
appreciation of the significance of informational access in the formation of knowledge. 
Children's Understanding of Self-Knowledge and Other-Knowledge 
One of the main purposes of the present study was to compare children's reports of 
their own states of knowing with reports of the states of knowing of others. Our findings in 
Experiments 1 and 2 consistently support our hypothesis that children's self-understanding 
was better than their other-understanding. This is similar to what Wimmer et al.(1988) 
found, children were considerably better at judging their own knowledge than they were at 
assessing the knowledge of another. However, the type of knowledge studied in Wimmer 
et al.(1988) was declarative knowledge ("knowing that") whereas ours included children's 
judgments for declarative knowledge ("knowing that") as well as procedural knowledge 
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("knowing how"). Therefore, the claim that children have better understanding in self-
knowledge than other-knowledge could be extended beyond the mental state of "knowing 
that" and include that of "knowing how.” 
Inferring from our data, children seem to develop their understanding of their o：^ 
states of knowing earlier than that of others，. Such a sequence of development consistent 
with what is predicted by the simulation theory. According to the simulation theory, first-
person information about states of knowing has an immediacy and transparency, which are 
not available in information about others; therefore, children are likely based on their 
understanding of their own minds to infer about the mental states of others (Harris, 1992). 
Additional support for the claim that children's understanding of self-knowledge emerges 
earlier than their understanding of other-knowledge are also available in studies on origins 
of knowledge. 
As mentioned above, children's difficulty in answering questions about others, 
states of knowing may be result from their incapability to "feel," "sense," or directly 
"experience" the subjective events which occur in other's mind. However, we should note 
that subjective inner experiences do not necessarily imply an accuracy advantage to the 
judgments of self-knowledge as compared with the assessment of others' knowledge 
(Nelson, Kruglanski, & Jost，1998). As Miller (2000) claimed, children often have a 
tendency to over-attribute knowledge to themselves and under-attribute knowledge to 
another person. 
Indeed, children's superiority in self-understanding was only found in the knowing-
how and knowing-that tasks, but not in the false belief tasks. This is consistent with what 
Miller (2000) found in his review: there is little evidence for any primacy of self-
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understanding. Even though the studies reviewed by Miller (2000) were most in the 
standard false belief paradigm whereas the false belief task adopted here were in more 
alike a knowledge judgments paradigm, both found that children have similar level of 
understanding for self and other with regard to false belief. 
The reason why there was no self-other differences found in the false belief tasks 
might be due to the relatively late development of children's understanding of false belief 
when compared to their understanding of "knowing." As previous study found, children 
understand ‘‘knowing，’ before "thinking" (Fung, 2000), it is possible that children have not 
yet grasped the concept of false belief at the time being tested. Therefore, their 
performances in the false belief tasks for self were as poor as they were with others. In 
other words, if the children are tested at the age of 6 or 7，when they have developed some 
understandings about false belief, the self-other differences may be observed in the false 
belief tasks as well. 
Apart from the false belief tasks, the superiority of self-understanding may also 
constrained with children's own knowledge about the relevant information. As Experiment 
3 showed, when the children were ignorant about the contents of the drawers or the ways 
to perform the tricks, their pre-exposure knowledge judgments were better for Other 1 than 
themselves. This might resulted from children's overestimation of their own knowledge: 
they saw the Other 1 had access to the relevant information, they also assumed themselves 
have such knowledge and mis-attributed knowledge to themselves in the pre-exposure 
question. Another possibility is that the order of questions for self and the Other 1 
influence children's attribution of knowledge. Therefore, the results of Experiment 3 were 
confounded by both the children's access to the relevant information and the order of the 
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questions being asked. Further research with better control of these factors are necessary 
before we could tell if other-understanding is better than self-understanding in certain 
conditions. 
Regardless of whether the supremacy of self-understanding is significant or not, it is 
clear that empirically there is still much to be investigated about children's understanding 
of knowing with regard to s ^ and other. Since the other figures were all represented by 
puppets in our present study, it would be interesting in future research to allow children 
witness the process in which another real person gain knowledge of "knowing how" and 
, "knowing that." Similar experimental paradigms can be adopted: children's responses to 
self-knowledge questions are compared with their responses to questions about the states 
of knowing of others. Since children may find it difficult to imagine that puppets have 
mental states as human, if real perons are invited to act as the other figures, children may 
demonstrate better understanding of other's states of knowing as it is more close to what 
they experience in their everyday life. 
Moreover, it would be treasured to contrast children's attribution of knowledge to 
themselves with their attributions to several other figures who differ in the age dimension 
(e.g., a same-aged peer, a baby, and a daddy). Not surprisingly, many young children 
regard their parents as "superman"- parents know everything and capable of doing 
everything. Thus, when asked to attribute knowledge to Daddy / Mammy, children may 
consistently attribute "know" to their parents without considering their actual states of 
knowing. In contrast, baby is always regarded as "naive" and thus children may simply 
hold a belief that "babies know nothing." As for the attribution to peers, it may depend on 
the children's stage of development. If they are still egocentric, then they will attribute 
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knowledge to their peers according to their own states of knowing; otherwise, they will 
have objective judgments about others' states of knowing based on performance outcome 
and access to information. In short, further research on children's attribution of knowledge 
to others along the age dimension would provide us with another view about children's 
theories of knowing. 
Children's Understandings of "Knowing That" and ‘‘Knowing How" 
Apart from self-other comparison, our findings also address the concern of the 
differences in children's ability to make judgments about "knowing how" and "knowing 
that." Consistent with what previous study found, children were much better at making 
judgments of "knowing that" than they were at making judgments about "knowing how." 
Perhaps children have a better understanding of "knowing that" because of the nature of 
the tasks. It is relatively easy to tell the contents of drawers when compared with 
performing some actions in the knowing-how tasks. However, our procedures focus on 
children's abilities to judge the states of knowing at different critical phases of the tasks, 
rather than their abilities to become knowledgeable. In fact, we tried our best to make our 
knowing-how tasks comparable to the knowing-that tasks. Instead of using complex 
knowing-how tasks, we adopted simple knowing-how tasks, which could be acquired 
quickly on the basis of a single demonstration. In this way, the knowing-how tasks are 
parallel to the knowing-that tasks in the sense that children learned them in a single 
exposure. 
Indeed, even though the structures of the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks 
adopted here were designed to be similar as that of Fung (2000), there are differences 
between each experiment and Fung's (2000) study. First of all, the knowing tasks adopted 
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in Experiment 1 were actually a simplification. Instead of studying children's 
understanding of knowing in terms of several aspects (e.g., source knowledge, access to 
information etc.) simultaneously, Experiment 1 was solely designed to examine children's 
understanding of knowing in terms of informational access with the addition of the other-
part. With such a simple design, children showed better performances on the knowing-that 
tasks then in the knowing-how tasks. In Experiment 2, with the addition of others’ 
performance outcomes, children still showed better understanding of "knowing that" than 
of "knowing how." At last, children were kept ignorant to the contents of the drawers and 
the ways to perform the tricks in Experiment 3’ but still, children demonstrated better in 
their understanding of "knowing that." In short, despite differences in the design of the 
series of studies and regardless for self or other, the primacy of children's understanding of 
"knowing that" remains to be significant. 
(i) Pre-Exposure "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" 
In response to the pre-exposure knowledge question, no matter whether it refers to 
the one in the knowing-that, knowing-how or the false belief task, 3-year-olds had a bias 
towards claiming that they "know." For the 4- and 5-year-olds, they were able to indicate 
that they "don't know" before having had access to the relevant information. These results 
are consistent with that of Fung (2000). Although the response bias among the 3-year-olds 
demonstrates their misconception of knowing and a lack of representational theory of mind, 
it is suggested that such a bias is very useful to children's acquisition (Bjorklund & Green, 
1992). Being optimistic about one's own competence, children will explore the world 
around them with confidence. Also, their interest in learning tend not to be hindered by the 
realistic worries of inability. As expected, children will recognize their "naive" attitude as 
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they grow older, which in return weakens their response bias. However, the rate of 
disappearance could differ among different mental states. 
In the present study, children's understanding of "knowing that" appears to emerge 
earlier than that of "knowing how.” For example, as can be seen in Figure 21，3-year-old 
children's performance on pre-exposure questions for s ^ were found to be more or less 
the same in the knowing-that and knowing-how tasks. Nevertheless, by the age of 4， 
children's response bias of "know" judgment decreased from above chance level (mean 
number of "know" judgments = 1) to below chance for the concept of "knowing that" but 
not for "knowing how.” Among the 5-year-olds, their response bias seems to completely 
disappear in the knowing-that task while it remains in the knowing-how task. 
(ii) Awareness of a Transition from "Not Knowing" to "Knowing" 
The tricks used in the knowing-how tasks were assumed to be novel to the children. 
Therefore, the children should have experienced a major change with their procedural 
knowledge, that is, the change from not knowing to knowing. Similarly, children could not 
guess the contents of the drawers without looking in them in the knowing-that tasks; 
therefore, they also experienced a change in factual knowledge when the experimenter 
showed them the contents. In short, an awareness of the transition from not knowing to 
knowing is a prerequisite for understanding the mental states of "knowing how" and 
"knowing that." 
Indeed, the pre- and post-exposure knowledge questions of the present study 
captured children's awareness of the mental states of "not knowing" and "knowing," 
respectively. As mentioned before, the 3-year-olds consistently made errors in their 
responses to the pre-exposure knowledge questions; however, they were able to answer the 
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post-exposure knowledge questions correctly across tasks. This indicates that although the 
3-year-olds do not have an awareness of their "ignorant" mental state, almost all of them 
were able to recognize that they were in the state of "knowing" after being exposed to 
relevant information. For the 4- and 5-year-olds, since they already understood their 
ignorance in the pre-exposure phase, they appreciated the transition from not knowing to 
knowing more than their 3-year-olds counterparts. This result is consistent with what 
Taylor, Esbensen, and Bennett (1994) found. They found that young children are 
surprising unaware of changes in their knowledge. It was suggested that children's 
inability to appreciate the transition in states of knowing may be due to a general inability 
to store or retrieve temporal events in memory (Esbensen, Taylor, & Stoess，1997) or a 
lack of an understanding in representational change (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). 
Apart from testing children's awareness of a transition from not knowing to 
knowing, the pre- and post-exposure knowledge questions were also designed to examine 
children's understanding that "knowing how" and "knowing that" are indeed products of a 
person's exposure to relevant information. 
(Hi) The Role of Informational Access in Knowledge Formation 
Once children have an awareness of a transition from not knowing to knowing, they 
should appreciate the role of informational access in the formation of "knowing how" and 
"knowing that." Children need to grasp the causal relationship between exposure to 
relevant information and the resulting epistemic effect (e.g., knowing the contents of the 
drawers or knowing how to perform tricks). Such understanding could be evident when 
children correctly judge another person's states of knowing when the other's knowledge 
can only be inferred from the person's exposure to relevant information (Experiments 1 and 
Children's Understanding of Knowing 42 
3). After children have understood the critical role of information access, they should be 
capable of judging whether another person "knows" or "does not know" based on whether 
the person had or did not have access to relevant information. 
The discriminate knowing measures constructed from children's responses to the 
pre- and post-exposure questions in the knowing-how and knowing-that tasks revealed 
children's understanding of the significance of informational access in the formation of 
knowledge. On the one hand, if children erred in that they claimed that another person 
"knew" before informational access was provided, they had probably not yet regarded 
informational access as an essential component for knowing. On the other hand, if children 
erred in that they claimed another person "didn't know" after he/she had access to the 
relevant information, they seemed to be neglect the fact that informational access leads to 
knowledge. Regardless of the type of error made, the discriminate knowing measure is a 
sensitive indicator of children's understanding of the importance of informational access. 
As can be seen in Figures 4 and 9, the means for the discriminate knowing 
measures are all above zero, indicating that children in each age group were more likely to 
attribute knowledge, for both "knowing that" and "knowing how," to Other 1 (who had 
informational access) than Other 2 (who did not have informational access). This shows 
that children have at least a basic appreciation of the role of informational access in the 
formation of knowledge. Moreover, children's performance appears to be more accurate 
with increasing age and better for "knowing that" in comparison to "knowing how." This 
indicates that children's understanding of the importance of informational access gradually 
develops across preschool ages and emerges earlier in the concept of "knowing that" than 
in "knowing how." 
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However, in Experiments 1 and 2，children's error in attributing knowledge to the 
Other 2 (who did not have informational access) in the pre-exposure knowledge question 
and their correct attribution of knowledge to Other 1 (who had informational access) in the 
post-exposure knowledge question were confounded by egocentric knowledge attributions. 
Since in both Experiments 1 and 2，the self-part was prior to the other-part, children were 
always knowledgeable about the contents of the drawers (or how to perform the tricks) 
when the pre- and post-exposure knowledge questions for other were asked. Children 
might simply attribute knowledge to the Other 2 (no access) and Other 1 (with access) 
according to their own states of knowing. Thus, in Experiment 3，children's access was 
kept different from that in Experiments 1 and 2, they were ignorant of either the contents 
of the drawers or they ways in which the tricks were done. Also, children's knowledge 
judgments for others were tested before that for themselves. To examine whether these 
manipulations would affect children's attribution of knowledge to others, which in return 
might have an effect on their performance on the discriminate knowing measures. 
According to Wimmer et al. (1988)，judging others，knowledge without knowing 
the fact themselves might pose some difficulties for children. Thus, it was possible that not 
knowing what the other knew might have misled children to deny that the other knew. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 22, children's performance on the discriminate knowing 
measures in Experiment 3 was similar to that found in Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, our 
conclusions remain. In this regard, our data demonstrated children's concern of the 
importance of access to information in their knowledge attributions. 
In fact, understanding that access to information is necessary for knowing, children 
would be able to differentiate "to know" from “ to guess" on this basis. According to 
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Johnson and Wellman (1980)，4-year-old children can semantically differentiate between 
"know" and "guess" on the basis of whether a person has informational access. However, 
the children were in situations where the performance outcome was not salient. Beal and 
Flavell (1983) found that, when children are in the situation where the performance 
outcome is salient, they will focus on whether a person's answer is correct or incorrect, 
rather than whether the person has access to information. Our findings support the later 
claim. 
(iv) The Role of Performance Outcome in Knowledge Attribution 
As can be seen in Figures 10 and 11，whenever successful performances of the 
puppets were shown, almost all of the children, regardless of their age, attributed 
knowledge to the puppets no matter whether they had or did not have access to 
information beforehand. This indicates that according to children's theory of knowing, 
whether a person can act successfully or answer correctly is the best indicator of whether 
the person possesses the corresponding knowledge. In other words, young children tend to 
overlook the importance of access to information when they attribute knowledge to others; 
instead, they focus on other's performances outcome. As a matter of fact, the association 
of knowledge with successful performance is so strong, an outward demonstration of 
success is almost equivalent to being knowledgeable. 
Nevertheless, when the performance outcome was an unsuccessful one instead, no 
universal pattern of knowledge attribution was found; that is, not every child claimed the 
puppets who demonstrated a failed performance "did not know." (as can be seen in Figures 
12 and 13). Being shown a failed performance, 3-year-old children just attributed 
knowledge to others randomly in both knowing-how and knowing-that tasks whereas the 
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4- and 5-year-olds were more likely to attribute "don't know" to others. Consistently, 
children's understanding of "knowing that" appears to emerge earlier than that of 
"knowing how." As can be seen in Figures 12 and 13，the 4- and 5-year-olds were less 
likely to attribute "know" to the failure of others in the knowing-that task than they were in 
the knowing-how task. 
It is interesting to note that, the 4- and 5-year-olds had a higher tendency in 
attributing "knowing how" to the Other 1 (who had prior informational access), even if it 
demonstrated unsuccessful performance (as can be seen in Figure 12). Although it seems 
to be "wrong" to attribute knowledge to the Other 1 after the failed performance was 
shown, such an error might be justified if the children attributed knowledge to the Other 1 
based on its prior access to relevant information. It seems that the 4- and 5-year-olds might 
have considered both performance outcome and access to information as bases for 
knowledge attribution. Therefore, their errors in the knowledge attribution could be 
interpreted as a transitional stage in their understanding of knowing. 
According to Montgomery (1992), children appear to have a "theory of knowing," 
which is a coherent set of principles. These principles seem to have a hierarchical order in 
structure, that is, the components within the construct are weighted for salience or 
importance. For instance, outward demonstration of successfulness (or correctness) 
appears to be the most salient and important component of knowing for the 3-year-olds. 
Even though the 3-year-olds recognize that informational access is an important 
component of knowing, demonstration of successfulness in performing a trick (or 
I 
correctness in telling the contents of a drawer), in the absence of prior access to the 
relevant information, is enough for the children to attribute knowledge. As children's 
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understanding of knowledge develop, however, the hierarchical order of these components 
changes; for example, the children may view informational access as equally important as 
the outward demonstration of successfulness. With development, children gradually regard 
knowledge in terms of a number of preconditions. 
In the present study, since there were only two defining components of knowledge 
(access to information and performance outcome), children's task of attributing knowledge 
became rather straightforward. However, it was suggested that error comes with 
simplification (Montgomery, 1992) because placing too much importance on a component 
results in children's overestimate of knowledge in others. Such a claim may be useful in 
accounting for children's attribution errors to those who have prior informational access 
but demonstrated unsuccessful performance and those who have no prior informational 
access but demonstrated successful performance. 
Children's Understandings of “Knowing That" and "False Belief’ 
In the present study, the false belief tasks functioned as an alternative task to 
examine children's understanding of "knowing that." Indeed, the structure of the knowing-
that tasks and the false belief tasks was very similar. In both tasks, children were asked if 
they knew the contents of a closed container in the pre- and post-exposure questions. The 
difference between the knowing-that and false belief tasks was that children should have 
no idea about the contents of the drawers in the knowing-that task; however, they might 
have a false belief about the contents in the unexpected contents task. 
In order to compare children's performance across the knowing-that and false 
belief tasks, the discriminate measures seemed to be the best choice as they captured the 
most comparable aspects of the tasks. Empirically, the differences between children's 
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knowledge judgments in the knowing-that task and that in the false belief tasks were 
consistent across age and experiments. All of the three experiments found that children's 
performances on the discriminate measures, regardless for self or other, were better in the 
knowing-that tasks than they were in the false belief tasks (as can be seen in Figures 6，17， 
18 and 22). 
Since the present study was aimed at contrasting children's understanding of 
"knowing that，’ with their understanding of "knowing how," regarding the false belief task 
as a knowing-that task, it was important to compare children's performance on the 
knowing-how tasks with that in the false belief task. In contrast to the findings that 
children were better at their understanding of "knowing that" in comparison to "knowing 
how," (as can be seen in Figure 6, 17，18 and 22) children's performances on the 
discriminate measures were better in the knowing-how tasks than they were in the false 
belief tasks. This shows that although the false belief task could be regarded as a knowing-
that task, the two tasks indeed are subtlely different from one another. 
Actually, the false belief task adopted in Experiment 2 was a "real" test of false 
belief, since children were asked about their previous knowledge of the contents. In order 
to answer false belief test question correctly, children were required to suppress their 
current knowledge state and make judgments about their earlier lack of knowledge and 
false belief. Comparing across the pre- and post-exposure questions, which revealed 
children's understanding of current states of knowing, it was assumed that children would 
find it more difficult to answer false belief test question. This was anticipated because 
in order to answer false belief test question correctly, children are required to keep two 
different knowledge states in mind and make judgments about states that are different from 
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their current states of knowing. Yet, the 3-year-olds，performances on \hQ false belief test 
question were more or less the same as they were in the discriminate measure (as can be 
seen in Figure 15) whereas the 5-year-olds’ performance on \hQ false belief test question 
was significantly better than it was on the discriminate measure. This implied that 
children's understanding of their prior states of knowing (false belief) develop between the 
age of 3 and 4. 
In fact, false belief task is often regarded as a standard test for children's 
understanding of theory of mind with reference to "thinking." Thus, it is useful to treat it 
as a reference point for comparison. Among comparisons, it is consistently found that 
children's performance on the knowing tasks, regardless of whether knowing-how or 
knowing-that task, are better than they were in the false belief tasks. This implies that 
children understand the mental states of "knowing" before that of "thinking." This arises a 
question of why children understand the mental states of thinking later than that of 
knowing. Thus, it would be interesting to explore the reasons for such a developmental 
sequence of understanding in future studies. 
In conclusion, the present study found that children's understanding of "knowing 
that" is consistently superior to their understanding of "knowing how, regardless of 
variations between the tasks. Children appear to be better with self-understanding than 
they were in other-understanding. Also, children seem to regard performance outcome as a 
more important indicator of knowing when compared with the access to relevant 
information. 
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